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Abstract
In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from
the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local
governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives power to the
central government to replace democratically elected municipal officials who are poten-
tially connected with mafia with a commission of non-elected administrators. Fixed
effects model estimates that focus on a sample of municipalities from three Italian re-
gions (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia) for the period 1998 to 2013 show that the city
council dismissal of a municipality fosters a reduction in public investments in neigh-
boring municipalities. Additional empirical evidence suggests that this result could be
explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers potentially reducing miscon-
ducts in neighboring municipalities.
JEL Classification: D73, E62, E72, K42
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1. Introduction
Political corruption negatively affects economic growth and fosters excessive and
inefficient public spending (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001; Arin
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et al., 2011; Hessami, 2014). In countries where sub-national governments are left with
large autonomy, the negative effect is potentially amplified (Brueckner, 2000). This is
particularly important with respect to public spending as a decentralized setting could
worsen problems of corruption and increase the occasions that favor, for example, bribes
or rents (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Fan et al., 2009). Theoretical arguments and
recent empirical evidence suggest that monitoring activities and punishments could be
effective in reducing these types of misconducts making possible more efficient public
spending (Becker, 1968; Becker and Stigler, 1974; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003;
Olken, 2007; Litschig and Zamboni, 2011).
Interestingly, despite these relevant findings on the direct effect of anti-corruption
policies, there is very little empirical evidence focusing on their potential spillover ef-
fects.1
This paper aims to complement the existing research by analyzing the presence
of spillover effects that could come from anti-corruption policies. Every time there is
an intervention directed at fighting corruption in a specific area or jurisdiction, one
could expect its neighbors to be affected as well. For instance, the effective control
of illegal activities in the administration of a locality can yield positive spillovers be-
cause it works as a credible threat for similar activities in neighboring areas (Sah, 1991;
Rincke and Traxler, 2011). Nevertheless, alike to what happens with more common
criminal operations, one might also expect that dishonest conducts in public adminis-
tration will relocate to other jurisdictions (Knight, 2013; Dell, 2015). Moreover, anti-
corruption policies that have an important effect on the public budget can favor either
positive or negative fiscal spillovers (Besley and Case, 1995; Case et al., 1993). Hence,
whether spillover effects exist and whether they increase or decrease the benefits of
anti-corruption activities is an empirical matter.
Specifically, this paper empirically tests the presence of transitory spillover effects
by linking variation in spending on public investment by Italian municipalities with the
application of a policy that aims to control political corruption due to mafia infiltration
1For example, Silva (2010) and Carozzi and Muço (2015) account for the potential presence of
spillovers by studying the effect of Brazilian random auditing policy on neighbors’ outcomes (e.g.,
electoral results or corruption); Acemoglu et al. (2015) study spillover effects of local state capacity
in Colombia; Durante and Gutierrez (2015) investigate how inter-jurisdictional cooperation among
Mexican municipalities can prevent crime.
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in local administrations.2 For decades organized crime has taken advantage of local
spending by draining public resources.3 In 1991, after a period of very intense activity
by organized crime, the parliament approved a law that gives the power to the Italian
central government to dismiss the city council of municipalities where local officials are
found to have a potential relationship with the mafia. This law was issued with the
clear objective of cracking down on corruption in public administrations due to orga-
nized crime. From 1991 until 2013, there have been 243 council dismissals concerning
191 municipalities in total. Not surprisingly, more than 90% of these municipalities
belong to the three regions of Italy in which there is a historical presence of mafia-
type organized crime (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia). During the dismissal period of
usually 18 months, a commission of three technocrats, having equal powers as elected
officials, governs the municipality. I provide descriptive results that confirm the anec-
dotal evidence suggesting that commissioners cut expenditures on public investment as
these are likely to be affected by the mafia influence.
The central finding of this study is derived from a fixed effects model that values
the effect of city council dismissal in a municipality on the investment spending of its
neighboring municipalities. I do so using data from municipalities belonging to the
regions of Campania, Calabria and Sicilia considering the period from 1998 to 2013.
To reduce concern about potential selection bias, my estimates focus on the sample
of treated municipalities (i.e., those municipalities which have at least one neighbor
that experienced a city council dismissal in the period of time of the analysis). This
allows me to produce causal estimates of the spillover effects by exploiting both the
time series and the cross-sectional variation in the sample. Therefore, to give a causal
interpretation of the results, I rely on the assumption that the time of a council dismissal
in the neighboring area is random conditional on controls. I test the robustness of the
identifying assumption by first showing that unobservables need to be relatively large,
compared to observables, to invalidate my finding (Altonji et al., 2005; Oster, 2015).
Second, I apply a placebo test that suggests the absence of anticipatory effects.
2It is worth noting that the results from the Eurobarometer survey (issue 245) show that more
than 50% of the persons interviewed believes that most of the corruption is caused by organized crime.
Importantly, Italy is the country with the highest percentage of people agreeing on (71%).
3Estimates from the Corte dei Conti, the Italian Court of Auditors, suggest that nearly 40% of the
cost of large-scale public investments is due to corruption.
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From these first estimates, I suggest that spillovers exist as the compulsory ad-
ministration of a municipality negatively affects public investments in its neighbors.
These results, however, do not yield clear evidence on the mechanism by which these
spillovers exist. For instance, this reduction in investment could be due either to a
reduction in corruption or waste (i.e., law enforcement spillover), or the consequence
of fiscal spillovers (i.e., yardstick competition and benefit spillovers). Hence, I provide
further checks, which indicate that a large part of the negative effect on investment
can be explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers. In fact, I find that the
municipalities which actually react are those which are more likely to generate illegal
activity (i.e., those municipalities where the mafia is active). Further, I specifically rule
out the presence of fiscal spillovers due to yardstick competition by showing that elec-
toral incentives do not significantly affect the main result. Finally, I apply a falsification
test showing that spillovers are present only if commissioners are assigned because of
mafia infiltration and not for other reasons.
Overall, this analysis provides a new empirical evidence that polices put in place
to reduce corruption could produce spillover effects. In the case of Italy, compulsory
administration seems to cause positive spillovers as there is a decrease in public in-
vestment in jurisdictions neighboring the areas that are subject to the intervention.
Further evidence suggests that this effect is potentially driven by a reduction in mis-
conducts in the neighboring local administrations. In sum, the results highlight that
anti-corruption policies can induce benefits which spread beyond the geographical limits
of the intervened jurisdiction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the insti-
tutional framework while Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical estimation.
Section 4 lays out first results on the direct effect of compulsory administration on
the municipal budget and provides an explanation on the potential mechanisms that
produce spillovers. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy. Section 6 shows and
discusses the results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Institutional Background
2.1. Municipal level institutions and budget
Italy is structured on three different sub-national tiers of government. There are 20
regions (regioni), 110 provinces (province), and around 8000 municipalities (comuni).
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The focus of this paper will be on the lowest administrative unit of government. Italian
municipalities are administrated by the mayor (sindaco) together with the executive
branch (giunta) and the city council (consiglio comunale). The mayor and the city
council are elected for a term of 5 years. The former has a limit of two terms and
chooses the members of the executive branch. In general, national parties participate
in local elections, though in smaller municipalities the presence of independents or local
parties is fairly high. National and local parties, commonly, form coalitions and stand
for elections with the same mayoral candidate.
Italian municipalities’ spending responsibilities are in different areas such as the
environment (e.g., water and waste management, pollution monitoring, regulation and
preservation of urban green spaces), education (e.g., kindergarten, supplementary ser-
vices for primary school), transport (e.g., road maintenance, public transport), welfare
(e.g., social housing, aids to needy people) and culture (e.g., library, museum). Specif-
ically, considering the aggregated municipal budget for the year 2013, almost 30% of
the municipal expenditure is for administrative cost, while policy related to traffic and
transport, and to environmental services accounts, respectively, for 20% and 13% of the
total expenditure. Moreover, around 70% of the total expenditure was used for current
spending while 16% went to investments. The remaining 14% came from either loans
repayment or expenditure on behalf of third parties.
These expenditures are largely covered by transfers from other tiers of government
or by the municipalities own revenue. The tax instruments at the hands of the munici-
palities are mainly property tax and a surcharge on the national income tax.4 In 2013,
roughly 40% of the revenue was derived from local taxation, while 15% from transfers
and another 15% from non-tax revenues. The remaining 30% came from either sales of
public assets, loans or revenue on behalf of third parties .
2.2. The law against mafia infiltration
Italy suffers from the pervasive presence of organized crime. In recent decades,
in addition to the problems that organized crime created in the real economy, mafia
4The property tax was abolished and reintroduced several times during the period of the analysis.
In the years in which it was not in place, municipalities usually received transfers from the central
government to compensate for the missing revenues.
5
infiltration in the public administration impacted and inflated public budgets.5 During
the 1980s and early 1990s several laws were passed in order to address the damages
that mafia-type organizations were producing in the Italian economy.6 Among these
measures, in 1991 the Italian parliament approved a law (D.L. 31/05/1991, n. 164)
that allows the central government, through the Ministry of Interior, to dismiss the
city council of municipalities that are found to have potential connections with the
mafia. In place of the democratically elected officials, a commission composed of three
non-elected members governs the municipalities for an in initial period of usually 18
months, which can be extended to a maximum of 24 months.7 The clear goal of this law
is to break the links between the local public administration and the mafia. Typically,
the process starts with a police investigation that identifies the presence of contacts
between municipal officials and organized crime. Interestingly, most of the time these
investigations begin for reasons which are extraneous to the direct involvement of mafia
in the public admnistration.8 This information is then passed to the representative of
the Ministry of Interior at the provincial level, the prefetto, which gives the task to a
commission to report, within 3 months, on whether the local government is likely to be
liable to prosecution. After the final report is drafted, the prefetto has 45 days to notify
the Ministry of Interior. The latter decides whether there are grounds to dismiss the
municipality and in that case the President of the Republic will confirm this decision by
issuing a decree. At the end of the period of compulsory administration, new municipal
elections are held.
5Caneppele and Martocchia (2014) describe in detail the different channels that the mafia uses to
take advantage of public contracts.
6Usually, laws were approved right after very violent attacks against people who were a symbol
of the war with the mob. For instance, article 416-bis of the penal code that specifically targets the
offence of mafia-type association (associazione mafiosa) was approved in September 1982 as a reaction
to the assassination of Gen. Dalla Chiesa, who was at that time the representative of the Ministry of
Interior in the province of Palermo.
7The law approved in 1991 was largely integrated in 1993 (D.L. 20/12/1993, n. 529) with details
on the actual powers of the commission. In 2000 (D.Lgs. 18/08/2000, n. 267) it was merged with
existing laws regulating the activities of local jurisdictions (TUEL). Additional changes occurred in
2009 (L. 15/07/2009, n. 94).
8Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sul fenomeno delle mafie e sulle altre associazioni criminali,
anche straniere - 2005.
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Since the law’s approval until the end of 2013, there have been 243 city council
dismissals involving 191 municipalities in total.9 Figure 1 shows the number of dismissed
municipalities by year. Of them, 147 experienced compulsory administration once, 36
twice and 8 three times. Further, the city council dismissal has been eventually declared
unjustified and hence revoked 19 times. To a certain extent, the fact that almost
one-fourth of these municipalities experienced the dismissal more than once suggests
that the application of this law does not seem to permanently affect the presence of
mafia activity in public administration. Indeed, many critics were expressly against
the law because of its very limited long-term effects. For this reason, the paper avoids
exploring the long run effects and focuses more on the existence of temporary effects
that correspond with the presence of the compulsory administration.
Table 1 provides insights on where these municipalities are located. As expected,
almost the totality of these municipalities are in southern regions which, traditionally,
have active Mafia-type crime organizations: Mafia in Sicilia, ’Ndrangheta in Calabria,
Camorra in Campania and Sacra Corona Unita in Puglia. Recently, however, Liguria,
Lazio, Piemonte and Lombardia have been experiencing a few city council dismissals.
3. Data
I assembled a database that brings together information from a variety of sources
for all municipalities belonging to the Italian regions of Campania, Calabria and Sicilia
over the period 1998–2013. As shown, compulsory administration for mafia infiltration
is more frequent in the south of Italy. Indeed, the regions of Campania, Calabria and
Sicilia account for more than 90% of all dismissals in the frame time considered here.10
This allows me to achieve a certain degree of homogeneity in the sample composition,
which helps to reduce bias stemming from using heterogeneous municipalities in terms
of unobservables. In addition, for data availability reasons, I have to restrict my data-
set from the year 1998 until 2013 by leaving out the first 7 years from the law’s approval.
This partial data, however, should not significantly impact my analysis, as I consider a
16-year period in which more than half of the total number of dismissals occurred.
9The complete list of all municipalities is reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
10Golden and Picci (2005) suggest that these are also the Italian regions with the highest level of
corruption.
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My first source of information is the website of the Minister of Interior, from which
I gather municipal spending data.11 I collect data on total expenditure, current expen-
diture and investment expenditure.12
Second, I have taken information about the political status of each municipality in
the sample from the database provided by the Ministry of Interior called “Anagrafe
degli Amministratori Locali e Regionali”, which contains information on public officials
in power in sub-central level jurisdictions. Since I noticed that this database sometimes
does not report clearly whether a municipality is under compulsory administration
because of mafia infiltration or not, I checked the original decrees of the President of
the Republic and complemented the database information accordingly. From here, I
construct two variables compulsory administration and council dismissal. The first one
is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the three-year period starting from the
year in which a municipality experiences a city council dismissal, and 0 otherwise. I do
so, since compulsory administration can be of different lengths (i.e., from 12 up to 24
months) but most of the time lasts for at least 18 months, and there is usually a 1-year
delay for budget decisions to take place. This is the more conservative way to look at
the effect of the compulsory administration as it considers all years in which either the
whole or at least part of the budget process has been affected by the commissioners.
The second variable, council dismissal, is equal to 1 for the year in which the city council
has been dismissed (i.e., the first year of compulsory administration), and 0 otherwise.
In order to create the main regressor, I relate the presence of compulsory admin-
istration with information on the level of neighborliness among municipalities. There-
fore, the variable neighbors compulsory administration is equal to 1 when at least one
neighboring municipality has the dummy compulsory administration equal to 1, and
0 otherwise. Similarly, the variable neighbors council dismissal is equal to 1 when at
least one neighboring municipality has the dummy council dismissal equal to one, and 0
otherwise. Specifically, the measure of neighborliness is constructed by using data from
the “Matrici di contiguità, distanza e pendolarismo” provided by the Italian statistical
11I am thankful to Luca Repetto for having shared his data on municipal expenditures to allow me
to check and complement my database.
12In a few cases the website of the Minister of Interior was missing information with respect to
municipal budgets. Although this slightly reduces the total number of observations in the sample, it
should not affect my analysis as these occurrences are likely to be random.
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office. Geographical proximity is probably the most relevant characteristic to take into
account. Hence, my definition considers neighbors of a municipality i all those munici-
palities that share a border with it. This is a standard approach in the research related
to spillovers.13 Indeed, I expect the physical closeness among municipalities to be the
right measure to account for the relevant theoretical channels supporting my empirical
analysis, which are highlighted in Section 4.2.14
Additionally, I create two dummy variables: other council dismissal and other com-
pulsory administration. Both account for a council dismissal in a municipality for
reasons other than mafia infiltration. While the first variable is equal to 1 only in the
year in which the dismissal occurred, the second takes value 1 for a two-year period
from the beginning of the dismissal. That is because in these cases the commissioner
stays in power for 1 year, rather than 18 or 24 months, which means that the period
in which his decisions can take effect is shorter than that of compulsory administra-
tion for mafia infiltration.15 These events are ruled by the law D.Lgs. 18/08/2000, n.
267 art. 141. For instance, commissioners are called to govern a city whenever there
is a resignation of elected officials, the annual budget is not approved or the mayor
dies. Clearly these are more common events compared to compulsory administration
for mafia infiltration. Moreover, the variable commissioner accounts for whether in
a given year a municipality is run by commissioners (i.e., governed by commissioners
either because of mafia infiltration or due to other reasons) or by elected officials.
Again from the “Anagrafe degli Amministratori Locali e Regionali”, I compute fur-
ther variables that I use as additional controls. Local party takes the value 1 when a
municipality is governed by a mayor who has no party affiliation or who belongs to a
list with no clear connection to a national party, and 0 otherwise. A second variable,
electoral cycle, is a measure that weighs the strength of electoral incentives depending
on the expected time (in years) from the next election. Thus, as the electoral incentives
are stronger when the elections are closer, the variable counts the number of years from
13See, for example, Case et al. (1993), Bordignon et al. (2003) and Lyytikäinen (2012).
14Summary statistics of each variable are reported in Table 2. Figures B.1, B.2 and B.3 in Appendix
B show where the municipalities of interest are located.
15Following the strategy mentioned in the previous paragraph, I also compute the variables neighbors
other council dismissal and neighbors other compulsory administration.
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the last election.16
Further, I collected time-varying control variables from the “Atlante statistico dei
comuni” provided by the Italian statistical office. These variables include municipal
population and dependency ratio. I construct the latter using the percentage of the old
and young population (share pop > 64 and share pop < 15 ).
Finally, I define the time-invariant variable mafia. It identifies those municipalities
where the mafia is more likely to be active and hence the probability of having a cor-
rupted municipality is relatively higher. Thus, following Buonanno et al. (2015), the
variable mafia is a dummy that takes the value 1 for each municipality that experienced
at least one real estate or firm seizure related to crimes committed by mafia-type orga-
nizations. I use data provided by the ANBSC (Agenzia Nazionale per l’amministrazione
e la destinazione dei beni sequestrati e confiscati alla criminalita’ organizzata) that ac-
counts for the number of seizures connected to mafia-type organizations starting from
the 1980s until the end of 2012.
4. The consequences of a city council dismissal
4.1. The direct effect of compulsory administration
All actions taken by the commissioners aim at eliminating political corruption and
ensuring the smooth functioning of the local administration. This is the central aim of
the policy. Typically, the commission uses its power to cancel any contract or concession
confirmed by previous governors that is clearly illegitimate. Other immediate cuts in the
budget are normal as the commissioners need time to gather more information on the
general status of the expenditure structure. However, these important reductions in the
budget are usually experienced in the first year of compulsory administration while in
the remaining periods there is usually an increase in expenditure due to implementation
of the new decisions taken by the commission. Interestingly, Acconcia et al. (2014)
provided both anecdotal and empirical evidence on the effect compulsory administration
has on public decisions showing that provinces with at least one council dismissal reduce
16It happens that this variable reports values higher than 4, which is supposed to be the highest
possible value because elections are held every 5 years. This is due to the arrivals of commissioners
right at the end of the term.
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the total amount of investment in infrastructure compared with provinces with no
dismissal.
To make sure that compulsory administration has direct impacts on different cate-
gories of municipal spending in line with existing research, I report below some useful
descriptive evidence. I run two sets of regressions where I link municipal annual bud-
gets and compulsory administrations focusing on the 124 municipalities from my sample
that experienced at least one dismissal. The first set investigates what happens to the
budget the first year the commission takes office. In the second set, I test how the
presence of commissioners affects spending in the following years (three-year period).
Table 3 shows the results from the OLS estimates using as a dependent variable, sepa-
rately, municipal total expenditure, current expenditure and expenditure on investment
in per capita term. The results reported in column (1) of Table 3, show that the current
expenditure is not affected in the first year of the city council dismissal while invest-
ment is more than 45% lower than the average expenditure from the other periods.
This strong reduction in investments affects total expenditure, which also experiences
a slight decrease. Column (2) highlights that compulsory administration significantly
lowered expenditure not just in the very first year but also in the following years. In this
case, total and current expenditure are not affected. Instead, spending in investment
is reduced, on average, by nearly 15% in each year of the three-year period after the
council dismissal.
It is worth noting that these results are not meant to identify the direct effect of
corruption on public spending, though the presence of a decrease only on investment,
and not in current spending, is in line with previous research showing that corruption
can lead to potentially inefficient over-investment in the public sector (Mauro, 1998;
Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000). In fact, further reasons could explain this evidence. For
instance, compulsory administration might improve the quality of the local officials.
Indeed, there is a high probability that municipal officials during the compulsory ad-
ministration are more competent than those previously in power. The latter relies on
the assumption that education level is positively related to competency (Galasso and
Nannicini, 2011; Besley et al., 2011). If this is the case, a commission composed of
senior officials from the Italian civil services is likely more competent than an average
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mayor from a dismissed municipality.17 Moreover, from a political economy perspec-
tive, one can argue that the dismissal of a city council because of mafia infiltration
replaces politicians with bureaucrats. As it is well known in the literature, decisions of
politicians with electoral incentives are different from decisions of bureaucrats (Besley
and Coate, 2003; Alesina and Tabellini, 2007). For example, the latter are less prone
to be influenced by lobbies or enact policy just to please voters.
Summing up, compulsory administration along with a reduction in corruption pro-
duces a negative effect on public spending on investment. However, whether the latter
is solely a direct consequence of the former is not clear as other possible mechanisms
could take place at the same time.
4.2. Compulsory administration and spillovers
This paper evaluates spillover effects by looking at how municipal investment spend-
ing is affected by the crackdown on political corruption in a neighboring municipality.
Since local spending decisions could be responsive to several of the consequences of the
crackdown in the “vicinity”, I discuss a number of relevant competing channels.
For instance, Sah (1991) suggests that law enforcement can produce spillovers. He
argues that an individual’s perceived risk of punishment, which has a direct impact on
the probability of engaging in criminal activities, is endogenously determined and it
importantly depends on detections in the vicinity.18 Here, this would mean that the
presence of a municipality under compulsory administration might affect existing fraud-
ulent activities in other neighboring jurisdictions as it updates agent’s risk perceptions.
In a recent study, Rincke and Traxler (2011) provide empirical evidence confirming
Sah’s (1991) predictions. They show that Austrian households’ compliance behavior
with respect to TV license fees increases in those communities where some households
experience enforcement from the arrival of licensing inspectors. Importantly, they show
increasing compliance among both treated and untreated households. Therefore, one
17Interestingly, local officials are not only better during compulsory administration. Daniele and Geys
(2015) study the effect of compulsory administration for mafia infiltration on the level of education of
the newly elected representatives after compulsory administration. They find that they are on average
more educated compared to those from the dismissed city council.
18Sah’s (1991) model relaxes the assumption of exogeneity of the risk and perception of detection,
which is standard in the literature building on the influential model of crime by Becker (1968).
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should expect that the city council dismissal would produce a decrease in the occurrence
of corruption activities not just in the municipality affected but also in its neighbor-
ing municipalities. In this scenario, the spillover effect should produce a reduction in
neighboring municipalities budgets.
Alternatively, as corruption is driven here by the presence of organized crime in the
public administration, one might expect a reaction from the criminal organization that
aims at compensating for the reduced amount of revenues from public resources coming
from the dismissed municipality. For instance, one might expect an increase in the
number of other types of illegal activities in the dismissed municipality. However, for the
scope of the current study, the most interesting event would be the potential temporary
relocation of the mafia interests to other areas.19 In this scenario, the mafia would
have the incentives to meddle with public activities in the neighboring municipalities.
Indeed, if this was the mechanism at work, one should expect an increase in spending
on investment in these municipalities.
Finally, as one of the clear effects of compulsory administration is a reduction in
public investments, fiscal spillover might show up as well. These competing channels
focus on the well-established idea in public finance that spending decisions from one
government should be affected by decisions taken by its neighbors (Besley and Case,
1995; Case et al., 1993).20 In particular, yardstick competition models link the quality
of a government with the performance of its neighbors (Besley and Case, 1995). Under
the assumption that neighboring municipalities have similar shocks, voters can infer the
quality of a government by comparing its performance with that of its neighbors. Hence,
office-oriented politicians will adjust fiscal decisions accordingly to their neighbors to
maximize their probability of reelection or political consensus. In this context, the
dismissal of a municipality produces two consequences: first, it reveals the quality of
former local officials; second, it improves the quality of the local officials by assigning
power to the commission. These information shocks increase the awareness of citizens
with respect to the quality of their own politicians who may react by mimicking the
behaviors of the commissioners. Therefore, one may expect that public investment will
19See, Knight (2013) and Dell (2015) as recent empirical examples that stress how law enforcement
affects crime relocation in neighboring jurisdictions.
20See also, for example, Baicker (2005), Bordignon et al. (2003) or Solé-Ollé (2006).
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decrease not only in municipalities put under compulsory administration but also in
neighboring jurisdictions. An alternative explanation is the presence of classical benefit
spillovers where public goods or services provided by a jurisdiction increase the utility
of citizens from neighboring municipalities because they consume them free of charge
(Case et al., 1993).
Overall, city council dismissals should produce enough changes so that in the case
spillovers exist they would impact budget decisions in neighboring municipalities. How-
ever, both the mechanism through which the externality should occur and whether this
is positive (i.e., decrease in neighboring expenditure) or negative (i.e., increase in neigh-
boring expenditure) is not clear.
5. Methodology
5.1. The estimation strategy
Most of the literature on spillover effects has focused on standard spatial econo-
metric models. In principle, these models improve the results from OLS estimates
by taking care of the omitted variable bias due to the spatial correlation (Anselin,
1988). However, in a recent contribution, Gibbons and Overman (2012) contend that
the identification of these models is correct only if very strong assumptions hold and
therefore their results could be misleading.21 Interestingly, the policy under study can
be considered as a source of exogenous variation that is likely to overcome issues rising
from spatial dependence in the error terms. Hence, a reduced form approach based
on OLS models, which satisfy specific identifying assumptions, should allow estimates
with causal interpretation. My strategy is composed of two steps. First, I evaluate
whether council dismissal in a municipality affects public spending of neighboring mu-
nicipalities. While this analysis emphasizes whether spillovers are likely to exist or not,
21Typically, these models use an IV strategy where the policy implemented by a jurisdiction (e.g.,
tax rate or public expenditure) is regressed against a weighted average of those implemented by its
neighbors. Eventually, socio-economic characteristics of these neighbors are used to instrument the
endogenous variable. These instruments, however, do not seem to satisfy the required exclusion restric-
tion. Indeed, it is likely that either the instruments do directly affect the main dependent variable or
there are unobserved characteristics which are correlated with both the instruments and the dependent
variable. An alternative methodology is the Maximum Likelihood (ML), which still relies on strong
assumptions in terms of both exogeneity and distributional and functional form.
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it does not reveal anything about the mechanism through which city council dismissals
should affect neighbors’ budget. Hence, as a second step, I complement this approach
by further checks that aim at understanding which channels are likely to play a role.
Formally, in the baseline analysis I estimate the following model:
Yipt = βTit + αXit + δi + χpt + it, (1)
where i denotes a municipality, p the province and t the year. Yipt, the dependent
variable, refers to expenditure in the investment of a municipality i in year t. Instead,
Tit, depending on the specification, is equal to either neighbors city council dismissal
or neighbors compulsory administration. The first variable takes the value 1 the year in
which at least one neighbor experience a council dismissal, while the second is a dummy
taking the value of 1 if at least one of the neighbors of the municipality i experiences a
city council dismissal in year t or has experienced it in the previous two years (i.e., in t,
t−1 or t−2). Xit are time varying municipal controls, while δi and χpt are municipality
and province-year fixed effects, respectively. Finally, it is the error term.
5.2. Identification issues
As already suggested, under certain conditions, the estimates of the β coefficient
from the fixed effects model of equation (1) can mimic a randomized experiment and
represent the causal effect of compulsory administration on local public spending of
neighboring municipalities.
A first concern is that the municipalities which are neighbors of a municipality
put under compulsory administration could be systematically different from the other
municipalities in the sample. In this case it would be difficult to make a comparison
because the city council dismissal would affect “treated” and “un-treated” municipalities
in very different ways. In order to get rid of this potential selection bias, I decide to
focus all my regressions only on those municipalities that experienced the treatment
at least once (i.e., have at least one neighboring municipality put under compulsory
administration in the time period considered). Although this implies a reduction in the
number of municipalities considered, it makes it possible to produce causal estimates
under weaker identifying assumptions.22 In fact, given the previous sample restriction
22The whole sample would be composed of 1348 municipalities. With the restriction it includes
around 400 municipalities with each of the two different measures of neighborliness I use.
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the estimates will provide a causal evidence if the timing of city council dismissal among
neighboring municipalities is random conditional on the controls. With regard to this,
it is worth stressing that for a municipality the occurrence of a city council dismissal
has some elements of exogeneity as the decision is taken by the central government.
Nevertheless, one may still expect that municipalities that are put under compulsory
administration have engaged in behaviors triggering the city council dismissal. Yet, this
event is clearly exogenous and potentially unexpected for their neighboring municipal-
ities (i.e., those I am interested in). However, in order to consistently reduce further
concerns about potentially omitted variable bias, I control for fixed and time varying
municipal characteristics.
The model includes municipality fixed effects to control for distinctive municipal
features that are fixed over time. This removes concerns about specific municipal char-
acteristics that could bias the estimates because they are correlated with budget deci-
sions. For instance, they account for the historical presence of organized crime in a given
municipality and its effect on public spending. Importantly, the main specification also
controls for all time-varying characteristics at the provincial level. The inclusion of the
province-year fixed effects is a very strong element in my specification as it controls
for attributes varying over time for a rather small geographical area (e.g., GDP shocks
or changes in the provincial government). They control for potential variability, both
within and between provinces, in the abilities of the prefetto in running his office and
thus of properly using the policy of interest. Additionally, as I already described in
the data section, I include a set of time-varying control variables that might help in
increasing the precision of my estimates.
Finally, I follow two different approaches in order to test the identifying assumptions.
First, I look at the relative size of the omitted variable bias by examining how the
inclusion of additional controls affects the size of the coefficient of interest. On the
one hand, the introduction of controls can produce a significant variation in the main
coefficient. This implies that the estimated coefficient is likely to be affected by the
introduction of even more controls and, hence, the bias coming from omitting controls
could confound my estimate. On the other hand, the inclusion of further controls
can have a very limited impact on the size of the main coefficient. In this case the
stability of the coefficient would favor a causal interpretation of the results. I follow the
papers of Altonji et al. (2005) and Oster (2015) to produce a formal test. Therefore,
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I quantify how large the effect of unobservables has to be to neutralize the estimated
effect under the assumption that the selection on observables is proportional to the
selection on unobservables. Second, I give evidence from a placebo test that controls
for anticipatory effects by including leads that represent dummies for future compulsory
administration in neighboring municipalities. This should emphasize whether municipal
spending was somewhat affected by the presence of unlawful conduct in an eventually
dissolved neighboring municipality.
5.3. Identifying the channels
While the baseline specification aims at estimating the effect of the council dismissal
on neighboring municipalities’ spending, it does not deal with the alternative theoretical
reasons on why this might occur. In Section 4.2 I suggested a number of explanations on
why spillovers should exist. Although it is arguably difficult to empirically distinguish
among the different determinants of spillovers, I complement the basic results with
additional estimates.
I begin by looking at how the main regressor interacts with variables that proxy ei-
ther for presence of local officials’ electoral incentives or of corrupting behaviors (mafia).
One relevant channel that could explain spillovers from the city council dismissal
to the spending decision of neighbors is yardstick competition. As described in Section
3, I constructed the variable electoral cycle to account for the variability of electoral
incentives over the years of each term. That should help me to verify whether the effect
on expenditure of a city council dismissal in a neighboring municipality increases the
closer the year of the next election. Hence, I run the following equation:
Yipt = β1Tit + β2Tit ∗ ElecCycleit + αXit + δi + χpt + it, (2)
that replicates the main specification of equation (1) but adds the interaction between
electoral cycle and either neighbors city council dismissal or neighbors compulsory ad-
ministration. Therefore, if yardstick competition is the explaining mechanism, I should
expect the interaction term to be significantly different from 0 and the sign to be the
same as Tit, as its effect should be stronger.
Alternatively, I aim at testing whether there is relocation of mafia activity or attenu-
ation of corruption activities in other municipalities. In order to study these alternative
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mechanisms I estimate the following model:
Yit = β1Tit + β2Tit ∗Mafiai + αXit + δi + χpt + it, (3)
which adds to my main specification a term that interacts either neighbors city council
dismissal or neighbors compulsory administration with the variable mafia which defines
which of the municipalities are more likely to be mafia-ridden.
Unfortunately, it is a very hard task to measure the variation in mafia activity
over time in a given municipality. This is also more challenging in this analysis as I
am using municipal observations.23 Nevertheless, my baseline specification implicitly
controls for variation in mafia-activities over time at the provincial level (province-year
fixed effects) and accounts for the historical presence of mafia in a specific municipality
(municipality fixed effects). Indeed, it is worth mentioning that several studies on the
origins of organized crime in the south of Italy have confirmed that the location of mafia
activity across different areas today has arisen from the specific conditions of decades or
centuries ago (Buonanno et al., 2015). Therefore, if the presence of mafia in a territory is
to a certain extent predetermined, I can test the plausibility of this channel by verifying
whether the presence of mafia activity in a municipality makes the potential spillover
stronger or weaker. The idea is that ceteris paribus municipalities that are likely to have
a history of mafia in the territory should react differently to the city council dismissal
of a neighboring municipality with respect to the other municipalities in which the
mafia is less likely to be present. If there is a relocation of fraudulent activities to
neighboring municipalities, the sign of the overall effect is supposed to be positive.
However, organized crime could move to where it is not already active or increase its
strength in municipalities where it is long-standing. Therefore, the interaction term
could go in either direction.
The same equation can be used to test the case of law enforcement spillovers, which
produce an attenuation of corruption in neighboring municipalities (i.e., the overall ef-
23Of the existing research about mafia in Italy, there is no study that accounts for variation over time
of mafia activity at the municipal level. Papers that study the municipality level (see, for example,
Barone and Narciso (2015)) focus on cross-section analyses. The other papers that account for variation
over time of mafia activity were aggregating information at a provincial level (see, for example, Acconcia
et al. (2014) or Pinotti (2015)).
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fect is negative). In this case the variable mafia tells something about the probability
of having a corrupted government in a municipality, assuming that mafia-ridden mu-
nicipalities are more likely to be corrupted. Again, the focus is on the interaction term.
Thus, I expect the effect to be stronger in those municipalities with a higher probabil-
ity of mafia presence in their territory, which means a negative sign for the interaction
term.
It is worth mentioning that for both equations (2) and (3) the identifying assumption
is the same as that in the baseline analysis. Indeed, the variable mafia is fixed and
local elections in Italy do not occur for all municipalities in the same year (i.e., they do
not have a systematic correlation with the presence of compulsory administration in a
neighboring municipality).
To summarize, the overall effect is supposed to be negative if either yardstick com-
petition or law enforcement spillovers are present, while it should be positive if there is a
relocation of mafia activities. Under yardstick competition, the interaction term needs
to be negative, as I expect stronger incentives the closer are the next elections. Also
positive law enforcement spillovers should produce a negative sign in the interaction
term, as the municipalities more affected by a reduction in corruption in a neighboring
municipality are those more likely to be corrupted. Moreover, if there is a relocation of
mafia activity, the sign of the interaction can go either way.
Finally, similar to Acconcia et al. (2014) and Daniele and Geys (2015), I provide
additional results from a falsification test in which I focus on the effect generated by
city council dismissals that occurred for reasons not related to mafia infiltration in the
public administration. The idea is to look at how local spending reacts to the occur-
rence of such an event in a neighboring municipality and compare it with the effect
already estimated in previous sections. To do so, I replicate part of the results using
as main regressors either other compulsory administration or neighbors other council
dismissal or neighbors other compulsory administration instead of compulsory admin-
istration, neighbors council dismissal and neighbors compulsory administration, respec-
tively. If the intervention of commissioners who are in power for reasons other than
mafia produces a similar direct effect on investment (i.e., a reduction on expenditure on
investment in municipalities that experience the council dismissal), then I can empha-
size the presence of fiscal spillovers that are not determined together with a crackdown
in corruption. In other words, law enforcement spillovers should not be observed in this
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scenario. Therefore, if I find spillovers in both types of compulsory administration it
is likely that fiscal spillovers are in place (i.e., either yardstick competition or benefit
spillover). Instead, if only compulsory administration for mafia infiltration produces
spillovers, these are more likely to be either law enforcement spillover (negative sign)
or mafia relocation (positive sign).
6. Results
6.1. Baseline results
Table 4 reports the effect of compulsory administration in a municipality on public
investment of neighboring municipalities using the two different regressors I mentioned
in the previous section: neighbors city council dismissal or neighbors compulsory admin-
istration. Importantly, as I am considering only the group of “treated” municipalities,
this coefficient identifies the average treatment effect on the treated. In the first three
columns (1 to 3), the focus is on a three-year period from the city council dismissal,
while the latter three (4 to 6) account for the very first year of compulsory administra-
tion.
In column (1), I include only the main regressor without any additional controls.
The coefficient would suggest a reduction of investment of 8% when a neighbor is put
under compulsory administration. However, this effect is not significantly different from
zero from a statistical point of view.24 In column (2), I add municipality fixed effects
and province-year fixed effects. The estimated effect is now 6% and is significantly
different from 0 at the 5% level. Column (3), where further municipal time varying
controls are considered, suggests again a reduction in investment of nearly 6% and has
the same level of significance as the previous estimate. This evidence confirms that city
council dismissals have a significant effect on the budget of those municipalities that
are geographically closer if I consider a three-year period.
These results, however, are not confirmed if I look at the effect occurring the first
year of the dismissal. In fact, in none of the last three columns (4,5 and 6) is the main
regressor significantly different from 0, though the coefficient is consistently negative.
The discrepancy between the two effects highlights that neighbors’ reactions take place,
on average, with a delay with respect to the actual council dismissal.
24In all regressions I use standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year.
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Interestingly, compulsory administration reduces investment in both the municipal-
ities experiencing the dismissal (Table 3) and their neighbors. Hence, this finding is
consistent with some of the alternative mechanisms that are described in section 5.3.
In fact, the reduction in investment could be due either to local officials who want to
maximize their electoral support by mimicking the behavior of the commission or to
the attenuation of fraudulent activity or positive benefit spillover.
The presence of spillover effects with regard to the policy under analysis is already
an interesting result. Indeed, it adds to the literature more evidence on how policy
and decisions from different jurisdictions might be interdependent. Moreover, different
from the majority of the existing literature, this result comes from a quasi-experimental
framework that in principle produces casual estimates bypassing some of the issues
arising from the use of standard spatial econometrics methods.
In the next sections, I test the identifying assumptions (i.e., whether the city council
dismissal of a neighboring municipality is random conditional on the controls) and
provide additional results to identify the channels more likely to explain the baseline
results.
6.2. Checking the identifying assumptions
The first element to emphasize is the relative stability of the coefficients shown
over the different specifications in Table 4. If one considers the three-year period of
compulsory administration, the effect decreases from 8% of the first specification to 6%
when I include all controls, while for its first year it moves from 7.4% to 3.4%. More
formally, Table 5 reports the results of a test in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005) and
Oster (2015).25 The key information is in the last two rows, where the parameter δ
and the identifying bounds are displayed. The former tells how large the selection on
unobservables has to be such that the results are canceled out while the latter reports
the set of values the coefficient can take assuming a δ = 1. Interestingly, the computed δ
for the estimates in columns (2) and (3) are much higher than 1, which is the threshold
usually considered to define whether the results are robust or not (Oster, 2015). More
specifically, δ is 11.20 and 7.88 in column (2) and (3), respectively. Therefore, the effect
of unobservables needs to be roughly, at least, 7.5 times stronger than the one from
25For further details and a formal derivation of δ and the identification set see Oster (2015). All
calculations are made using the PSACALC stata module by Oster (2013).
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observables, so that the effect is completely nullified. Also, all the identification sets
estimated include only negative values. The results shown in columns (5) and (6) are
also robust as the δ are still higher then 1. Overall, these results do not seem to be
biased by omitted variables possibly correlated with both the dependent variable and
treatment.
As a further test to check the reliability of my analysis, I investigate the presence
of anticipatory effects. To do so, I introduce leads of Neighbors counc. dism. up to 4
years, to the full controlled regression (i.e., column (6) of Table 4). These results are
reported in Table 6. Expenditure on investments in year t is not associated with the
city council dismissal in future years. This is true either if one looks at each individual
year separately or at the overall effect of the following 4 years. To conclude, both
robustness checks seem to confirm the identifying assumptions, thus reinforcing the
causal interpretation of the baseline results.
6.3. Testing the mechanisms
Table 7 shows the results from estimates of equations (2) and (3). Both columns (1)
and (3) report that the interaction between either neighbors compulsory administration
or neighbors council dismissal and mafia is negative and significantly different from
0 at the 1% level. Moreover, the dummy neighbors compulsory administration is not
significantly different from 0 and it is positive in both specifications. Specifically, ex-
penditure investment decreases by 12% in mafia-ridden municipalities sharing a border
with a municipality that experienced compulsory administration. Interestingly, a simi-
lar result also appears when I consider the regressor that identifies only the first year of
the council dismissal, though in the baseline estimations reported in Table 4 there was
no significant effect. In this case the reduction in investment is 11%.26 These findings
favor the hypothesis that law enforcement spillovers could be driving the overall effect
emphasized in the baseline analysis.27 Indeed, the city council dismissal in a neighbor-
ing municipality does not affect expenditure on investment in those municipalities in
26These come from summing up the two reported coefficients respectively, in column (1) and (4)
of Table 7. The p-value of the joint significance of the two coefficients in column (1) is 0.007 and in
column (3) is 0.009.
27These results also implicitly rule out the presence of benefit spillovers as they are expected to have
an homogeneous effect on neighbors.
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which the probability of having mafia activity in the territory is low (i.e., mafia=0).
Instead, the effect is negative and significant in municipalities that are more likely to
have the presence of mafia activity starting from the arrival of the commissioners in the
neighboring municipalities.
Columns (2) and (4) show the effect of the city council dismissal interacted with
the time from the last election, which fills in for the strength of the electoral incentives.
The interaction terms of both specifications are not significantly different from 0, hence
it rules out the presence of spillover of yardstick competition in this specific framework.
Still, the electoral cycle variable is always significant and positive, confirming the hy-
pothesis that expenditure increases the closer are elections. The coefficient of neighbors
compulsory administration, as expected from the main analysis, is significant and also
negative when the neighbors are computed in terms of spatial proximity.
Finally, to further investigate the law enforcement channel, Table 8 reports the
results from the falsification test. Columns (1) and (2) present the direct effect of
experiencing a city council dismissal for reasons other than mafia. This is estimated
considering only those municipalities from the whole sample that experience at least
one city council dismissal of this kind in the period of the analysis. There is a drop
in public investment in both the first year of the dismissal and in the two-year period
that follows the council dismissal. This is probably due to the fact that the commis-
sioner is often called to resolve conditions of financial instability, and hence they put
forward strong actions to reorganize the municipal budget. I present this descriptive
evidence to emphasize that it is comparable to what is reported in Table 3 where the
focus was on council dismissal for mafia infiltration. The results shown in columns (2)
through (6) of Table 8 are estimated for a restricted sample of neighbors. I include
only municipalities that are studied in the main analysis and also experienced at least
a city council dismissal in their neighbors for reasons other than mafia. The number
of municipalities goes from 406 to 368. These estimates suggest that city council dis-
missal for reasons other than mafia do not significantly effect spending on investment
of neighboring municipalities. Interestingly, the fact that a municipality is identified as
mafia-ridden or not does not seem to matter.
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7. Conclusion
Anti-corruption policies such as monitoring and auditing of public officials’ activities
seem to be effective mechanisms for solving corruption and misconduct in lower levels of
government. Nevertheless, when illegal activities in the local public administration are
regular events, these kinds of policies are more likely to produce indirect consequences to
neighbors that may potentially reduce or increase their actual efficiency. In this paper,
taking the case of Italy, I provide the first empirical evidence showing the existence of
positive spillovers.
Specifically, I explore the effect of an Italian policy that produces an important
exogenous break in the governance of those municipalities whose representatives’ deci-
sions are affected by organized crime. In fact, once the potential connection with mafia
arises, the minister of interior replaces the city council of these municipalities with a
commission composed of three bureaucrats who govern for typically three semesters.
The presence of the commission significantly reduces municipal spending on investment.
Interestingly, my estimates show that the same policy also negatively affects neighbor-
ing municipalities’ investments. Again, during the first three years after the dismissal
of a neighbor, the municipal spending on investment decreases at a yearly average of 6
percent. I check the identifying assumption of my empirical strategy in two ways. First,
I show that unobservable factors need to be relatively large to completely neutralize
my findings. Second, I provide results that exclude the presence of any anticipatory
response to the arrival of the commission.
However, as spending spillovers are possible for several reasons, I test alternative
mechanisms. Neither yardstick competition nor the relocation of mafia activities in the
neighborhood seem plausible explanations. Instead, the analysis suggests that positive
law enforcement spillovers indirectly affecting mismanagement in neighboring munic-
ipalities is the potential mechanism at work. In fact, I show that only mafia-ridden
municipalities (i.e., those with a higher probability of corruption in public administra-
tion) are those affected by the arrival of commissioners in the neighboring municipalities
and that compulsory administration for reasons other than mafia do not produce any
spillover.
All these findings are coherent with Sah’s (1991) model. The presence of com-
missioners in a municipality affects the perceived probability of punishment of public
officials from neighboring municipalities, which are expected to change their behavior
24
accordingly (i.e., decrease misconducts). However, this mechanism produces conse-
quences which are heterogeneous depending on the propensity for crime of each group
of municipalities. Hence, only the municipalities where illegal activity is potentially in
place will experience a reduction in expenditure.
In conclusion, anti-corruption policies can create law enforcement spillovers. Still,
further investigations are needed to evaluate whether my findings are specific to the com-
pulsory administration policy applied in Italy or can be generalized to anti-corruption
policies in place in other countries.
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Figure 1: Council dismissals by year.
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Table 1: City council dismissals by region and province
Basilicata Calabria Campania Lazio Liguria
Matera 1 Catanzaro 8 Avellino 4 Roma 1 Imperia 2
Cosenza 2 Benevento 1
Crotone 4 Caserta 33
Reggio Calabria 45 Napoli 51
Vibo Valentia 14 Salerno 6
Lombardia Piemonte Puglia Sicilia
Milano 1 Torino 3 Bari 5 Agrigento 7
Lecce 2 Caltanissetta 6
Catania 10
Messina 3
Palermo 26
Ragusa 1
Siracusa 1
Trapani 7
Notes: The table displays the number of municipality dismissals for the period 1991-2013 by region and province.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Bordering municipalities
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Total expenditure p/c 1323.38 977.66 6303
Current expenditure p/c 700.86 297.41 6303
Investment expenditure p/c 388.55 786.71 6303
Council dismissal 0.015 0.121 6303
Compulsory administration 0.038 0.192 6303
Other council dismissal 0.037 0.19 6303
Other compulsory administration 0.07 0.255 6303
Neighbors council dismissal 0.112 0.315 6303
Neighbors compulsory administration 0.266 0.442 6303
Neighbors other council dismissal 0.198 0.399 6303
Neighbors other compulsory administration 0.335 0.472 6303
Electoral cycle 1.866 1.408 6303
Commissioner 0.066 0.249 6303
Mafia 0.572 0.495 6303
Local party 0.378 0.485 6303
Population 16325.86 61661.39 6303
Dependency ratio 0.349 0.036 6303
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Table 3: Compulsory administration on local spending
(1) (2)
First year Three-year period
Dependent Variable Coef. Stand. Error Coef. Stand. Error
Total expenditures -0.071*** 0.026 -0.031 0.038
Current expenditures 0.009 0.017 -0.018 0.024
Investment expenditure -0.466*** 0.097 -0.148* 0.084
Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions where the dependent variable is the Log
of the reported category of expenditures per capita. These estimates consider annual infor-
mation for all municipalities from the regions Campania, Calabria and Sicilia, with at least
one city council dismissal in the period from 1998-2013. The main regressor in the estimates
are: in column (1) a dummy equal to 1 the year a municipality is put under compulsory
administration, and 0 otherwise; in column (2) a dummy equal to 1 for the year, and the
following two years a municipality experiences a council dismissal, and 0 otherwise. Stan-
dard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Municipal investment and council dismissals in neighboring municipalities
Bordering municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighbors comp. admin. -0.087 -0.067** -0.061**
(0.057) (0.033) (0.031)
Neighbors counc. dism. -0.074 -0.040 -0.034
(0.079) (0.048) (0.048)
Municipality FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Province × year fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.001 0.382 0.391 0.001 0.382 0.391
N 6303 6303 6303 6303 6303 6303
N mun 404 404 404 404 404 404
Notes: The dependent variable is the Log of investment expenditure p/c. Neighbors compulsory adminis-
tration is a dummy taking the value of 1 if at least one of the neighbors of the municipality i experiences a
city council dismissal in year t or have experienced it in the previous two years (t− 1 or t− 2). Neighbors
council dismissal is a dummy taking the value of 1 the year in which a neighboring municipality expe-
riences a council dismissal. Municipality control variables are: local party, population dependency ratio,
electoral cycle and commissioner. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two ways by
municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
Table 5: Selection on unobservables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Uncontrolled Controlled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Controlled
Coefficient -0.087 -0.067 -0.061 -0.074 -0.040 -0.034
R-squared 0.001 0.382 0.391 0.000 0.382 0.391
δ 11.20 7.88 3.92 2.84
Identified Set [-0.067,-0.061] [-0.061,-0.054] [-0.034,-0.022] [-0.041,-0.022]
Notes: The dependent variable is expenditure on investment. The reported coefficients are those of Neighbors comp. admin. in
columns (1) to (3) and Neighbors counc. dism in columns (3) to (6). Each column replicates the specification used in Table 4. δ is
calculated assuming Rmax = 1.3R-squared and β = 0. The identified set is calculated assuming Rmax = 1.3R-squared and δ = 1.
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Table 6: Pre-adoption effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bordering municipalities
F Neighbors counc. dism. 0.006 0.006
(0.056) (0.062)
F2 Neighbors counc. dism. 0.018 0.041
(0.038) (0.052)
F3 Neighbors counc. dism. -0.044 -0.033
(0.037) (0.048)
F4 Neighbors counc. dism. 0.042 0.046
(0.047) (0.053)
Overall effect 0.060
Joint significance (p-value) 0.611
Notes: The dependent variable is the Log of investment expenditure p/c. The regression
includes Leads of the variable Neighbors council dismissal, which is a dummy taking the
value of 1 the year in which at least one neighboring municipality experiences a council
dismissal. The estimations include both municipal and province-year fixed effects and the
following municipality control variables: local party, population dependency ratio, electoral
cycle and commissioner. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered two
ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Testing the mechanism
Bordering municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbors comp. admin. 0.032 -0.111**
(0.047) (0.045)
Neighbors comp. admin. X Mafia -0.156***
(0.061)
Neighbors comp. admin. X Electoral cycle 0.026
(0.018)
Neighbors counc. dism. 0.112 -0.057
(0.073) (0.068)
Neighbors counc. dism. X Mafia -0.228***
(0.074)
Neighbors counc. dism. X Electoral cycle 0.012
(0.025)
Electoral cycle 0.065*** 0.071***
(0.010) (0.009)
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.392 0.392 0.391 0.391
N 6303 6303 6303 6303
N mun 404 404 404 404
Notes: The dependent variable is the Log of investment expenditure p/c. Neighbors compulsory adminis-
tration is a dummy taking the value of 1 if at least one of the neighbors of the municipality i experiences
a city council dismissal in year t or has experienced it in the previous two years (t− 1 or t− 2). Neighbors
council dismissal is a dummy taking the value of 1 the year in which a neighboring municipality experi-
ences a council dismissal. Mafia is a dummy taking the value of 1 for each municipality that experienced
at least one real estate or firm seizure related to crimes committed by mafia-type organizations. Electoral
cycle counts the number of years from the last election. Municipality control variables are: local party,
population, dependency ratio, electoral cycle and commissioner. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard
errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Falsification test: Municipal investment and council dismissals not for mafia infiltration
Direct effect Spillover effects
Bordering municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Other comp. admin -0.356***
(0.056)
Other counc. dism. -0.354***
(0.070)
Neighbors other comp. admin. -0.001 -0.019
(0.031) (0.044)
Neighbors other comp. admin. X Mafia 0.055
(0.061)
Neighbors other counc. dism. 0.029 0.011
(0.028) (0.045)
Neighbors other counc. dism. X Mafia 0.032
(0.068)
Municipality FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality control variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.010 0.006 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
N 6854 6854 5741 5741 5741 5741
N mun 439 439 368 368 368 368
Notes: The dependent variable is the Log of investment expenditure p/c. Other compulsory administration is a dummy
taking the value of 1 if a municipality experiences a city council dismissal for reasons other than mafia infiltration in
year t or have experienced it in the previous year t − 1. Other council dismissal is a dummy taking the value of 1 the
year a municipality is put under compulsory administration for reasons other than mafia. Neighbors other compulsory
administration is a dummy taking the value of 1 if at least one of the neighbors of the municipality i experiences a city
council dismissal for reasons other than mafia in year t or have experienced it in the previous year t− 1. Neighbors other
council dismissal is a dummy taking the value of 1 the year in which a neighboring municipality experience a council
dismissal for reasons other than mafia. Mafia is a dummy taking the value of 1 for each municipality that experienced
at least one real estate or firm seizure related to crimes committed by mafia-type organizations. Municipality control
variables are: local party, population dependency ratio, electoral cycle and commissioner. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors clustered two ways by municipality and by year. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 and ***p < 0.01.
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A. Appendix
Table A.1: List of municipalities experiencing a city council dismissal (1991-2013)
Acerra Condofuri Montecorvino Pugliano San Luca
Aci Catena Corigliano Calabro Nardodipace San Paolo Belsito
Adrano Cosoleto Nettuno San Procopio
Afragola Crispano Nicotera San Tammaro
Africo Delianuova Niscemi Santa Flavia
Altavilla Milicia Ercolano Nocera Inferiore Santa Maria La Carita’
Amantea Fabrizia Nola Sant’Andrea Apostolo dello Ionio
Ardore Ficarazzi Orta di Atella Sant’Antimo
Arzano Frattamaggiore Ottaviano Sant’Antonio Abate
Augusta Frignano Pagani Sant’Ilario dello Ionio
Bagaladi Furnari Pago del Vallo di Lauro Santo Stefano in Aspromonte
Bagheria Gallipoli Pantelleria Sant’Onofrio
Bardonecchia Gela Parghelia Sarno
Bordighera Gioia Del Colle Partanna Scafati
Borgia Gioia Tauro Pignataro Maggiore Scicli
Boscoreale Giugliano in Campania Pimonte Sedriano
Botricello Gragnano Piraino Seminara
Bova Marina Grazzanise Plati’ Siculiana
Briatico Gricignano di Aversa Poggiomarino Siderno
Brusciano Guardavalle Polizzi Generosa Sinopoli
Burgio Isca sullo Ionio Pollina Soriano Calabro
Caccamo Isola delle Femmine Pomigliano d’Arco Stefanaconi
Calanna Isola di Capo Rizzuto Pompei Strongoli
Calatabiano Lamezia Terme Portici Surbo
Caltavuturo Lascari Pozzuoli Taurianova
Camini Leini Quarto Terlizzi
Campobello di Licata Licata Quindici Terme Vigliatore
Campobello di Mazara Liveri Racalmuto Termini Imerese
Canicatti’ Lusciano Ragalna Terzigno
Capaci Marano di Napoli Recale Teverola
Careri Marcedusa Reggio di Calabria Torre Annunziata
Carinola Marcianise Riesi Torre del Greco
Casal di Principe Marina di Gioiosa Jonica Rivarolo Canavese Torretta
Casalnuovo di Napoli Mascali Rizziconi Trabia
Casaluce Mascalucia Roccaforte del Greco Trani
Casamarciano Mazara del Vallo Roccamena Tufino
Casandrino Melito di Napoli Roghudi Vallelunga Pratameno
Casapesenna Melito di Porto Salvo Rosarno Ventimiglia
Casignana Mileto S. Maria La Fossa Vicari
Casola di Napoli Misilmeri S.Lorenzo Maggiore Villa di Briano
Casoria Misterbianco Salemi Villa Literno
Castel Volturno Modugno Samo Villabate
Castellammare del Golfo Molochio San Calogero Villaricca
Castello di Cisterna Monasterace San Cipriano d’Aversa Volla
Castrofilippo Mondragone San Ferdinando
Cerda Mongiana San Gennaro Vesuviano
Cesa Monopoli San Giovanni La Punta
Cinisi Montalbano Jonico San Giuseppe Vesuviano
Ciro’ Montebello Jonico San Gregorio d’Ippona
Notes: This is a list of all municipalities that experienced at least one city council dismissal starting from the law approval in 1991 until
the end of 2013.
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B. Appendix
Figure B.1: City council dismissals (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia).
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Figure B.2: Neighbors’ city council dismissals - Bordering (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia).
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Figure B.3: Mafia-ridden municipalities - At least one seizure (firms or real estate) because of mafia
(Campania, Calabria and Sicilia).
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